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Abstract 
The study is important because there currently seems to be a gap in the literature, since most published research has 
highlighted India’s overall GDP growth rates. Little academic research has been done on the importance and 
performance of industrial sectors in a developing economy like that of India. The industrial sector there has 
languished at around 16% of GDP, which is much less than that of China or of any other country at India’s stage of 
economic development. 
The neoliberal reforms of 1991 in India removed tariffs and barriers to foreign trade and investment. India reduced 
the role of state and public sector, and dismantled controls, while increasing the role of the market and private sector 
within the economy. As a result, foreign capital investment and foreign exchange reserves improved. However, job 
expansion did not occur and there has been no corresponding decline in the share in agricultural employment. Even 
the much heralded IT sector’s dramatic expansion over the last two decades has provided jobs directly to less than a 
million people. 
This study argues that it would be misleading to think that a large country like India could industrialise and 
modernise its economy whilst the unequal distribution of land and rural assets, and the dismal performance of the 
agricultural sector remains. This study concludes that more than two decades have passed since the neoliberal 
reforms were launched, but industrial growth has still not witnessed rapid expansion, especially in manufacturing 
areas. It seems, then, that neoliberal policies have failed to create jobs and thus improve the living conditions of a 
significant proportion of the population.  
Keywords: Indian economy, manufacturing sector, and economic liberalisation 
1. Introduction 
The global economy has witnessed tremendous changes over the course of the last few decades with the developed 
countries having witnessed de-industrialisation i.e. the decline of the relative importance of manufacturing in terms 
of output, revenue generation and employment.  
For a heavily populated country such as India, the manufacturing sector still seems to be the only path which the 
traditional economy can take in order to secure better living conditions for the people. Therefore, industrialisation is 
seen as being crucial to transforming a backward economy with low productivity. By this, we do not mean to suggest 
that the solution lies in the type of industrialisation that is likely to create environmental and ecological crisis. 
However, a discussion concerning the type of industry lies outside the scope of this study.  
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the growth and importance of the industrial sector in India. There 
seems to be a gap in the literature because most research has chosen to highlight the overall GDP growth rates of the 
Indian economy (Basu and Maertens, 2007; Srinivasan, 2005), but little has been written about the industrial sector’s 
importance, performance and near stagnation in overall job creation since economic reforms were launched in 1991. 
India’s industrial sector has languished at around 16% of GDP, which is much less than that of China or any other 
country at India’s stage of economic development. 
The balance of payments crisis in 1991 took place after nearly a decade of stable economic performance i.e. lower 
inflation rates and some improvements in growth performance. In fact, these reforms had been preceded by 
pro-business reforms and India had borrowed from the IMF after the second oil shock. Economic reforms continued 
and by the mid-1980s further steps had been taken to de-regulate industry and trade. Economic liberalisation 
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involves adopting more open trade and capital accounts policies. High output growth and very little or negligible 
employment growth is a feature of the economy under neoliberal policies in India. Even stagnating or falling real 
wages, along with falling wage shares have not moved towards increased labour demand in the manufacturing sector 
(Nayyar, 2006). 
India has moved from a mixed economy, despite the fact that the private sector was much larger than public sector, 
but the government exercised a large degree of control via “license raj” to a less regulated and more open economy 
with the private sector designed to play a more significant role than the public sector. India’s engagement with the 
global economy has increased rapidly in recent decades. Despite all these stimuli, the options for industrialisation 
began to be exhausted by the mid-1970s and the big industrialists saw that only collaborations and joint ventures, 
along with the availability of foreign borrowing and foreign markets, could further their interests. In addition, some 
high tech and IT companies found their interests lay with increased global market integration and gaining more 
access to foreign technology to improve efficiency and productivity, and enhance their growth. All these domestic 
changes led to the launching of neoliberal reforms, which began in the early 1980s and with major large-scale policy 
change in 1991 (Siddiqui, 1991). Industries in India tend to be dominated by a large number of small enterprises and 
a few large companies.  
Since economic reforms in 1991, India has experienced rapid growth in the service sector without going through the 
intermediate phase of a significant expansion of the manufacturing sector. The aims of the neoliberal policies 
adopted in 1991 were mainly: to remove the capital control on production, prices and market forces to influence 
investment and operational decisions; to allow international prices and market competition to influence economic 
decisions; and to liberalise the financial sector and remove controls over the banking sector (such as reducing 
state-directed credits and freeing the interest rates); and finally, to privatise public assets. Liberalisation of trade and 
investment rules was relaxed in India in 1991 to attract foreign capital and investment, and it was hoped that such 
changes would be able to attract relevant sectors to India from global value chain production, which increasingly 
serve as a location for world market production; however, there had been little success to date (Nayyar, 2006). 
Indian economic growth reveals that this growth is unbalanced in terms of sector i.e. for nearly a quarter of a century 
services have grown much faster than other sectors in the economy. Growth in the industrial and agricultural sector, 
which provides jobs for the majority of the work force, has been slower. Despite high growth rates annually of more 
than 7%, developing economies such as India experienced a slight fall in their share of industry between 1998 and 
2010. Their share of agriculture also continued to fall, while the service sector has expanded sharply since the early 
1990s (Siddiqui, 2014a).  
Despite experiencing faster economic growth for over two decades, this has not created enough opportunity for the 
people working in agriculture to move out and find jobs in the industrial sector. This is because the industrial sector 
in India has experienced slow growth in employment i.e. less than 1% per annum. This structurally uneven growth, 
coupled with disproportionate policy and economic interventions, has led to the emergence of inter-sectoral 
differences, marked by agrarian crisis and slow industrialisation (Siddiqui, 2014a).  
In 2013, nearly 60% of total employment was still in the agricultural sector, with productivity levels which generated 
incomes which were less than one-fifth of those in the rest of the economy (Economic Survey, 2014). Highly 
productive agriculture cannot employ huge number of people. Therefore, the development of the manufacturing 
sector is essential for productivity growth and for the realisation of learning by doing and increasing returns 
associated with new processes and product differentiation.   
Despite the rapid growth India has made since reforms, in terms of employment it still remains primarily an 
agricultural economy, accounting for nearly two-thirds of total employment and a fifth of the country’s GDP. 
Between 1983 and 1993, employment increased by more than 2% per annum. Then, from 1994 to 2006, the economy 
grew faster but employment growth decreased to 1.8% per annum. Since 2006 matters have become worse in terms 
of employment growth. Employment elasticity, which is a measure of the jobs that economic growth produces, had 
been 0.44% between 1999 and 2005, while it declined to 0.01% for the period from 2005 to 2012 (Siddiqui, 2014a).  
For a meaningful understanding of the performance of the industrial sector in India, we must look at historical 
perspectives to compare this with past performance. According to the statistics, during the pre-reform period between 
1950 and 1960, the growth rate in the industrial sector was 6.1% per annum, which declined to an average of 4.8% 
between 1960 and 1980. However, it increased to 8.2% per annum between 1980 and 1990 (CSO, 2014). Despite 
post-reform period (1992-2012), industrial growth increased to an average of around 7% for India, while this figure 
was 11% for China for the same period per annum.  
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This article is organised as following. Following the introduction to this topic in section I, section II is briefly 
discusses the theoretical significance of the industrial sector. Section III analyses the relationship between agriculture 
and the industrial sector whilst sections IV and V focus on industrial growth during the pre-and post-Independence 
periods. Section VI then examines state vs. market policies, followed by a conclusion which summarises the 
findings.  
At present, the manufacturing sector contributes nearly 16% to India’s GDP, provides jobs to 10% of the country’s 
total workforce and produces nearly 80% of its total merchandise exports. Although manufacturing sector is 
relatively small in comparison to India’s whole economy, but this sector could play an important role in raising the 
productivity and in its development efforts.  
India’s policy makers have tended to focus largely on GDP growth and overlooked the fact that the economy needs 
to create more jobs. When India has the largest number of young people of any country in the world, merely 
providing them with education is not enough. We need to find the real constraints on the growth of enterprises.  
Between 1900 and 1946, primary sector growth was 0.9%, while the secondary sector growth was only 1.1% 
(Maddison, 1995). In contrast, from 1950 to 2013, the primary sector in India grew at an average of 2.2% per annum, 
and the secondary sector at 5.3%. Looking at individual decades, growth in the secondary sector was 6.7% in 
1980-1990, and while it slowed down somewhat in the post-reform period (1991-2013), the secondary sector still 
grew at an average of 6% per annum (CSO, 2014). The past decades in India appear to have witnessed inadequate 
diversification of India’s production structure away from agriculture and into manufacturing and somewhat 
premature rapid diversification into the service sector, (Siddiqui, 2015a).  
The methodology to be followed here is derived from the aims of the study and comparisons of international 
statistics provide the main means of addressing the research questions and the objectives of this paper. Analysing 
pre-existing secondary data is the only possible way to obtain macroeconomic data. These include data from official 
sources and from international institutions such as the World Bank and UNCTAD.  
2. Theoretical Significance 
The term ‘industrialisation’ refers to the shift in the pattern of a country’s output and workforce towards industry. 
The industrial sector becomes proportionally more import than the primary sector both in terms of employment and 
revenue generation. Furthermore, industrialisation seems to be very important in order to achieve affluence. Past 
experiences of developed countries suggest that to become prosperous a country needed to swing heavily towards 
expansion of manufacturing (Patnaik, 1979; Raj, 1986). 
According to Kaldor, industrialisation is a necessary stage of development, since it represents the development of 
productive forces and technology. In the developing countries industrialisation can play an important role as it saves 
foreign exchange by reducing imports and expanding employment opportunities; it lessens the burden on the 
agricultural sector, and also raises the overall productivity in the economy. The successful experiences of the 
industrialised countries also indicate that their success had been largely due to their strong manufacturing sector. As 
Kaldor observes that “The kind of economic growth which involves the use of modern technologies, and which 
eventuates in high real income per capita is inconceivable without industrialisation” (Kaldor, 1967:54). 
The growth of industry appears to be very important to the economic growth and well-being of the population of 
developing countries such as India. Kaldor (1967) identified what he considered to be the most critical issues in his 
‘Laws of Economic Development’. He sees the wider impact of the manufacturing sector as follows: 1) Higher 
growth in the manufacturing sectors could also lead to an increase in labour productivity; 2) Productivity in the 
non-manufacturing sector increases as the manufacturing sector expands; 3) Manufacturing is an engine of growth, 
not only because of higher productivity but also because of the external economies it generates, including forward 
and backward linkages; 4) As the manufacturing sector expands it provides job opportunities for the surplus labour in 
the agricultural sector, which ultimately reduces levels of unemployment and poverty (Kaldor, 1967). Job creation in 
manufacturing is related to the rate of growth of the output or value added. This, in turn, is linked with the rate of 
growth of wages relative to value added. Kalecki (1971) referred to the ‘mark-up price’ above the costs which the 
producers are able to charge or to the ‘degree of monopoly’ in the market.  
Industrialisation is important but the identity of the central actor driving the industrialisation process is also equally 
important. Past experiences of a number of countries show that industrialisation is not merely an instrument of 
economic growth but also has an in-built mechanism for distributing the costs and benefits of growth. However, it 
seems that the opening up of domestic markets and free trade as strategies for industrialisation can be incompatible 
with the circumstances, particularly for late-industrialising countries. For example, South Korea is characterised by 
active state intervention in the economy and the accumulation process was sustained (Amsden, 2003). Protection for 
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certain strategic industries by the state in South Korea was considered necessary in order to bring about a situation 
where integration with the world economy would lead to the development of industries and expansion in 
employment domestically.  
During the last four decades, the rapid economic transformation of the East Asian countries has become the most 
important development in the world economy. For instance, initially the development in Japan, then South Korea and 
most recently in China has been the most spectacular and the most widely discussed (Siddiqui, 2009; Das, 2006). 
However, proponents of ‘outward-looking’ industrialisation policy overlook the differences among the East Asian 
countries that successfully followed this policy (Siddiqui, 2013). Japan and South Korea had almost no foreign direct 
investment capital flows, while the economies of East Asian countries like Hong Kong, Singapore (Siddiqui, 2010) 
and more recently, China, have been dominated by inflows of foreign capital (Sen, 2007).  
Currently, China and India are among the fastest growing economies in the world. Despite the differences in the 
performance of the industrial sectors in both countries, industry could have a vital role to play in improving the 
economy, productivity and living conditions of their people. These two countries together constitute nearly 40% of 
the world’s population. Therefore, what happens to China and India is of great importance to academics and policy 
makers (Siddiqui, 2009).Manufacturing activities can be regarded as a critical engine of growth for the economy. 
The development of the manufacturing sector is seen to be crucial in order to allow India to expand supply and 
reduce the risk that the current growth spurt might not be sustainable because of supply side constraints (The 
Economist, 2007). 
3. Relationship between Agriculture and Industry 
Industry and agriculture are closely inter-related, as the performance of one sector affects that of the other. The 
agricultural sector provides raw materials for industries and also offers an important market for locally produced 
manufacturing goods (Siddiqui, 2015a). Earlier discussion of the relationship between industrialisation and 
agriculture by Prebisch, Lewis and others focused on agricultural growth as a very important stimulus towards rapid 
industrialisation through transfer of savings. Lewis (1954) emphasised that the agricultural sector plays an important 
role as a supplier of surplus to industry. He suggested that the supply of surplus from the agricultural sector and also 
a constant supply of workers at low wages could be important factors towards industrial growth. Lewis (1954) argues 
that: “Industrialisation is dependent upon agricultural improvement; it is not profitable to produce a growing volume 
of manufactures unless agricultural production is growing simultaneously. This is also why industrial and agrarian 
revolutions always go together. Economies in which, agriculture is stagnant do not show industrial development” 
(Lewis, 1954:433). 
Demand-side constraints and how these might impact on the demand for industrial product in the domestic market 
was another major issue. Kaldor (1967) focused specifically on the demand-side problem of industrial growth. 
According to him, the growth of agricultural surplus is an essential condition to raise the purchasing power necessary 
for sustaining industrial growth. Kaldor suggests that to sustain industrialisation the terms of trade between these two 
sectors should be in favour of agriculture. He further argues that agricultural productivity should be improved with 
the help of technology to increase surplus and that would keep the food prices low, while increasing the demand for 
industrial goods (Kaldor, 1967).  
The Prebisch-Singer model emphasises that elasticity is generally greater for manufacturing than primary products. 
Prior to industrialisation a country obviously had to resort to importing industrial goods and exporting primary goods. 
Prebisch-Singer OR Prebisch and Singer also noted that the terms of trade in the past had often been against the 
interests of primary producers, meaning that under such circumstances a country’s imports of industrial goods would 
be limited by its export earnings (Siddiqui, 1998). Thus, the dependence on importing industrial goods and modern 
technology would limit the possibilities of income growth. Under such circumstances, an import substitution policy 
would help the country to relax these constraints by economising on the use of foreign exchange (Singer, 1987).  
Moreover, the financing of the investment required by industries could be done by transferring funds from the 
agricultural sector. The terms of trade were favourable in the agricultural sector in India, especially in the period 
from the 1960s to the 1980s, but the outcome was that neither the industrial sector nor the rural poor benefitted from 
this. The Indian government refused to tax rich farmers and large land owners to raise revenue. As a result, the rural 
rich siphoned off most of the surplus, since they did not pay any direct taxation and deprived the rural poor by 
undermining land reforms and not implementing minimum wages (Siddiqui, 2015a).  
It appears that in the absence of significant improvement in the rates of growth in agriculture, in the near future there 
will be greater willingness to use imports to dampen down rising prices and place constraints on the supply of raw 
materials. K. N. Raj has commented: “Private consumers demand in a country such as India depends to a large extent 
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[...] on how things go in the agricultural sector. If output and income in this sector are rising rapidly, consumer 
demand for both agriculture and non-agricultural product can also be expected to increase rapidly, the latter being 
even more than the former since higher proportions are generally spent on non-agricultural products as levels of 
income rise (Raj, 1986: 225). 
4. Industrialisation during the Colonial Period: 1757-1947  
During the colonial period, modern industrial development in India was only carried out by the private sector 
because state investment in the industrial sector was dismal (Siddiqui, 1996). Academics have already discussed the 
19th century impact of the British rule on Indian industry, especially the decline of the indigenous handicraft 
manufacturing sector (Dutt, 1902; Anstey, 1957; Thorner, 1962; Siddiqui, 1990). However, the neoclassical 
economists choose to ignore past economic realities, failing to say anything about how a handful of metropolitan 
countries controlled global resources and created a new international division of labour to further their economic and 
strategic interests (Chang, 2010; Reinert, 2007; Siddiqui, 1990). 
British rule in India lasted for nearly 200 years. In terms of policies, it could be divided into three phases. The 
British’s own class forces changed which led to changes in policies in India. The first phase (1757-1813) could be 
termed as the merchant capital period. During this period, merchants enjoyed monopoly trade between India and 
Europe, dominated by the ‘East India Company’, a British trading company based in the City of London. During the 
second phase (1813-1890), the trade monopoly of the ‘East India Company’ was abolished and policies in India were 
enacted to promote British industrial capital. In the third phase (1890-1946) was led by the interest of the finance 
capital and it was dominated by the export of capital from Britain to India for mining, tea plantations, railways etc. 
During this period British investment in India was one-sided and did not stimulate overall industrial growth in India. 
Moreover, vast funds were spent for unproductive purposes such as the military, colonial administration, etc. while 
productive activity was confined largely to the extraction of raw materials. Even the banks and insurance companies 
were developed to stimulate the production of raw materials (Siddiqui, 1990:65).  
The primary method of surplus extraction in India was in the form of land revenue levies. Initially the East India 
Company’s trade was based on the import of Indian piece goods (such as muslin and calico), spices, indigo and silk. 
The trade was financed by the export of Treasury bullion from Britain. However, after the occupation of Bengal, the 
Company gained ultimate control of resources beyond their wildest dreams which they were able to exploit without 
having to pay but were able to sell at full price. This could be achieved by treating the entire revenue of India as 
gross profit (Bagchi, 1976). As Habib (1984) argues, following the Plassey victory in 1757 i.e. occupation of Bengal: 
“enormous individual fortunes were made, […] followed by a continuous extraction of wealth, through taxation, 
monopoly and corruption” (Habib, 1984: 5). 
The benefits that the industrialised countries derived from their colonial markets are ignored in neo-classical 
arguments (Krueger, 1987). The Colonies provided markets, supplied raw materials and cheap labour. The economic 
policies were formulated in the Colonies to suit the metropolis. For Britain, for example, the access to colonial 
markets provided assured markets for their manufactured goods but at the same time British protectionism ensured 
that Indian manufactured goods could not be sold into British markets (Siddiqui, 1990). The supply of cheap raw 
materials from India minimised inflation in Britain. Until the end of the 19th century, nearly half of British exports 
consisted of cotton textiles, destined chiefly for India and China, ironically at the same time that these two countries 
were themselves experiencing de-industrialisation, massive unemployment and poverty (Siddiqui, 2009). The 
international division of labour was created with the metropolis producing manufactured and exported high-end 
goods while the Colonies served as a source of raw materials and primary commodities.  
For the Colonies, the notion of ‘comparative advantage’ meant that they had to specialise in the production and 
export of raw materials. In fact, the adoption of such policies led to the perpetuation of mass poverty and famine in 
India for the whole of the 19th century and first half of the 20th. India proved to be useful to Britain as the surplus 
extracted from this colony was used to settle its deficits with the other industrialised countries whose goods it had 
imported. During the period from 1900 to 1946, India experienced near stagnation in per capita income, while GDP 
growth was minimal. Maddison estimated that growth in national output was only 0.81% per annum, whereas growth 
in per capita was dismal, being just 0.04% per annum (Maddison, 1995). In contrast to this, in the second half of the 
20th century the annual growth in GDP was 4.2% and per capita income was 2.1%.  
Thorner (1962) analysed the issue of the destruction of handicrafts in India. He defined de-industrialisation as either 
a decline in the proportion of the working population engaged in the industrial sector or a decline in the proportion of 
the total population dependent on the industrial sector. Thorner argues: “India’s national handicrafts have declined 
sadly from their pristine glory. This falling-off, however, was not a phenomenon peculiar to India but a worldwide 
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development affecting countries at different times. The ruin sooner or later of the old style craftsmen, was an integral 
part of the Industrial Revolution as the coming of the factory system” (Thorner, 1962: 70).  
However, it seems that such an argument ignores that industrial development in Britain as a colonising power and 
India as a colonised country had taken place in different circumstances. For example, in Britain, the traditional 
industries such as handicrafts faced destruction in the 19th century due to the rapid development of industries. People 
lost jobs in the traditional industries but the jobs created in the modern industries were much higher than those which 
were lost. However, the experience in the Colonies such as India was quite different. The British government used 
protective measures not only during the early years of the Industrial Revolution but right the way through until the 
1840s; however, no such protective measures were available for Indian industries. In India, handloom weaving and 
hand-spinning constituted the largest handicraft industries, employing a large number of people. Therefore, their 
destruction had a very depressive effect on the whole economy (Siddiqui, 1996; Bagchi, 1985; Habib, 1975). As 
Bagchi (1976: 154) observes: “Within India herself, when de-industrialisation drove labourers to seek their living in 
agriculture, they faced highly imperfect market, the most important complementary asset, land, being already 
concentrated in the hands of landlords”. 
The growth of the British textile industry practically wiped out India’s cotton goods markets in Britain, and even 
began to seriously threaten Indian industries in their home markets. For instance, Britain’s textile goods exports rose 
from 0.8 million yards in 1815 to 45,000 million yards in 1830; this increased again to 51.78 million yards in 1835 
and had reached 100,000 million yards by 1839. Cotton twist increased from just 8 IBs in 1814 to 4.56 IBs in 1828 
and 10.81 million IBs by 1839. In terms of monetary value, Britain’s total cotton exports to India amounted to £2.29 
million in 1839 whilst cotton twist was another £0.64 million. But by 1855 these figures had risen to £5.40 million 
and £1.27 million, while India’s manufactured cotton exports declined. For example, between 1794 and 1804 India’s 
piece goods exports were £2.42 million per annum. Later, this figure fell sharply to £0.69 million by 1849 (Anstey, 
1957; Dutt, 1902). Similar trends could be seen in other areas of Britain’s exports to Indian markets with iron bars, 
machinery, bolts, cutlery, guns, and glasses all having rapidly increased. This led to the ‘de-industrialisation’ of India. 
As Habib argues that “The urban decline, initiated by the diversion of surplus from the Indian ruling classes to the 
Company, spread quite naturally wherever the East India Company’s sovereignty extended. It was compounded 
many times over the urban unemployment by English manufacturers. This urban decline seems not only to have been 
in relative terms (percentage of urban population to total), but in absolute terms as well” (Habib, 1975: 38). 
The surplus was not invested domestically in India and did not create new jobs. As a result the Indian economy 
became subservient rather than sovereign in terms of policy matters. The fruits of its labour were systematically 
transferred to Britain or its new colonies of white settlers. Economic development was hampered by the removal of 
‘surplus’, high land rents and tribute charges, and also by the destruction of the Indian capitalist class meaning that 
they were unable to invest. A densely populated country like India was drawn into the orbit of exploitation in the 
mid-18th century and later on, in the interest of British industry, India was utilised as a huge market for their products. 
Moreover, as Bagchi (1985) argues: “Competition from the foreign cloth led to the unemployment among handloom 
weaver, where wages declined” (Bagchi, 1985: 101). The huge increase in the cultivation of the opium, indigo, tea 
and jute led to the decline of land available for the cultivation of food crops. As Bagchi notes about the changes in 
the production structure that, “The trade in opium illustrates how advanced capitalist countries have in the past 
moulded the production and consumption structure of the whole subcontinents and have impeded their progress” 
(Bagchi, 1985: 102).  
5. Industrial Performance from 1947 to 1990 
On the eve of independence in 1947 modern large scale industries and mining contributed just 7% of India’s GDP, 
while small scale industries accounted for 10% and the agricultural sector 49% and services and construction 34%. 
Total employment in the industrial sector was just 2.9 million people, which amounted to less than 2% of the total 
workforce. In contrast to this, the small industries employed a much higher proportion, some 7% of the workforce, 
while nearly 72% of the Indian workforce was employed in agriculture; services including construction employed 
18.7% of the total workforce. Cotton and jute were among the main modern industries established in the early 20th 
century in India (Siddiqui, 1996).  
In fact, even this lop-sided industrialisation that India had managed to achieve under colonial rule was closely linked 
to British industrial and financial interest rather than sovereign industrial growth (Patnaik, 1979). The anti-colonial 
struggle in India had a clear vision concerning the need for improvement in the material conditions of life of the 
people. Post-independence India the state played an active role, which was seen as beneficial by the industrialists 
who came up with ‘Bombay Plan’, which suggested that public investment was needed in key industrial sectors to 
boost the economy. The policy was aimed at developing basic industries via government planning, while the bulk of 
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the economy remained in the hands of private enterprises. India’s first Prime Minister, Nehru, was impressed with 
Soviet economic planning and the USSR’s rapid capital intensive industrialisation. It was said that such strategy 
posed a constraint on resources available for agricultural development. For example, government spending on 
agriculture and irrigation decreased from 34.6% in the first Five-Year Plan to 17.5% in the second Five-Year Plan, 
with investment in heavy industries being prioritised during this later period. The second Five-Year Plan in 1956 was 
launched to build ‘heavy industries’, which was seen as being essential for the country’s long term industrial growth.  
The “inward-looking” dirigiste economic strategy adopted in pre-reform period in India was seen as the most 
suitable option by the ruling elites. Also known as the ‘import substitution’ strategy option the public sector was 
expected to take a leading role in the development process. However, such policies were criticised by neoclassical 
economists as inefficient, promoting delays and corruption (Srinivasan, 20005). The proponents of neo-liberal 
reforms argue that: “Rather than adopting the classic Asian strategy −exporting labour-intensive low-priced 
manufactured goods to the West− India has relied on its domestic market more than exports, consumption more than 
investment, services more than industry, and high-tech more than low-skilled manufacturing” (Das, 2006:2).The aim 
was to remove serious gaps in the production structure. Due to the long gestation period, private investors saw such 
investments as high risk and also lacked funds (Patnaik, 1979).  
On the other hand, the government was determined not to tax the rich. Therefore, for public sector investment 
funding, the government relied on foreign aid, deficit financing and indirect taxation. As a result, for example, the 
share of indirect taxes to the total tax revenue increased from 61.9% in 1955 to 70.7% in 1966. Both indirect taxes 
and deficit financing were regressive, meaning that they had a dampening effect on income for the majority of people. 
As a result, the domestic market for mass consumer goods did not increase. Hence, further initiatives for investment 
and industrialisation by private investors were undermined (Raj, 1986).  
Between 1951 and 1965, the annual average industrial growth was 7%, which was much higher than anything that 
had been seen in the past. There was also a notable shift as the importance of traditional industries such as jute and 
cotton declined, while modern industries such as machinery, engineering, chemicals, rubber, pharmaceuticals, power 
and steel became more important. However, the industrial growth also coincided with huge increments in foreign 
debts and foreign aid, which meant that industrialisation in India was not financially self-reliant. Moreover, Indian 
industries did not allocate much money for research and development, which resulted in increased reliance on 
imported technology and foreign corporations. Although pre-reform industrialisation in India was impressive in 
terms of growth, it failed to make any dent on growing unemployment (Raj, 1986).  
Industrial stagnation marked the period from the mid-1960s to the end of the 1970s. Then in the early 1980s, the 
government took various measures to promote businesses and as a result the economy grew faster in comparison to 
previous decades, but the country relied heavily on foreign borrowings. The fiscal deficit and foreign debts had 
increased to high levels by the end of the 1980s. As a result, the debt service ratio had become untenable.  
6. Economic Reforms of 1991 and Industrial Growth 
In 1991, the Gulf War added to the fiscal crisis and a further crisis was just waiting to happen. The Congress 
government decided to accept an IMF loan and under the Finance Minister, Manmohan Singh, it began to implement 
neoliberal economic reforms. As a result, industrial licensing was discarded and import tariff rates were sharply 
reduced. The IMF and World Bank supported neoliberal reforms since the role of the state in the economy would be 
very limited. The product markets were liberalised and there was also a shift from ‘import substitution’ to 
‘export-oriented’ policies (Bhaduri, 1993). During the early 1990s, the Indian economy rapidly opened up. It seems 
that this was done not only to enforce a cost discipline on the supply side through foreign competition, but also to 
narrow the differences between domestic and international prices.  
The key question arises: What has happened to industrial growth since the economic reforms were undertaken in 
1991 in India? After two years of negative growth, growth rates began to increase in 1994. The annual growth rate in 
the manufacturing sector was 6.4%, which was lower than that during the 1980s, namely 8.2%. In manufacturing, 
various industries behaved differently. For instance, consumer durable goods continued to grow fastest but the 
capital goods industry suffered most. As a result, the annual growth rate of electrical goods declined by nearly 6.7% 
between 1991 and 1999. This was not due to a fall in the investment rate but because of increasing import 
competition, as tariff on imports were substantially reduced during this period.  
India’s foreign exchange balance started to rise from a very low level in 1991, when the economy was at very critical 
level. Exports have risen, especially in software and information-related technology. Exports as a percentage of GDP 
exceeded 10% for the first time in 1992 and then remained at around 19%. There was success in both the software 
and the pharmaceuticals sector and Indian corporations also invested overseas in buying international companies. 
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Since 2007, a number of Indian companies (such as Tata, Hindalco etc.) went for acquisition in the United States and 
various European countries on the strength of massive foreign currency loans at low costs. 
Panagariya (2004) argues that the surge in industrial growth in India which took place in the 1980s could not be 
attributed entirely to the economic reforms of 1991. The 1980s industrial policies could not be sustained over a 
longer period, as they relied on huge deficit financing and excessive foreign borrowings. According to Basu and 
Maertens (2007) argue that, “If India wants to sustain and raise even higher its current growth, the main bottlenecks 
in the Indian economy will need to be addressed. These are infrastructuressuch as roads, expensive freight rates, 
power supply, ports and airports, labour and bankruptcy regulations, and the high level of corruption” (Basu and 
Maertens, 2007: 164). 
With regard to the comparison between the manufacturing sector performance in the pre-and post-reform period, 
Nagaraj (2006) noted: “The growth rates for the period before reforms (1980-81 and 1991-92) are 7.4% and 7.6% 
per year respectively[...] However, there are no statistically significant changes in the trend growth rate of the 
registered manufacturing GDP after reforms” (Nagaraj, 2006: 180). 
The Economic Survey 2014 states that growth is the prerequisite for achieving several economic objectives including 
economic development, industrialisation and improving the living conditions of ordinary people. Prior to economic 
liberalisation, domestic savings were mobilised and invested in the public sector, which relied on domestic markets. 
But since the adoption of economic reforms, hopes have been pinned upon foreign capital and MNCs to achieve 
modernisation and productivity growth. However, growing trade deficits in the manufacturing sector clearly show 
that the manufacturing sector is losing its competitiveness across the range of medium- to high-tech goods. 
Manufacturing of this kind accounted for only 15% of India’s export earnings in 2010 as against a corresponding 
figure of 50% for China (UNCTAD, 2013: 173) whilst resource- and knowledge-based exports account for 25% of 
India’s total export earnings. 
In terms of ownership, industries in India have been largely owned and controlled by families as monopolies rather 
than having to face a competitive environment. These family-owned big businesses had long been operating in a 
non-competitive environment. 
It has been claimed that an increase in the rate of investment necessarily increases the rate of growth of aggregate 
supply of goods and services (Srinivasan, 2005). But if there is no mechanism in the economy which can generate a 
corresponding and equivalent growth in aggregate demand, then an increase in the rate of growth in the economy 
would lead to an increase in unsold goods and services. The intersectoral shift in the workforce from agriculture to 
manufacturing slowed down during the period 1990 to 1997 and labour productivity in the non-agricultural sector 
(including manufacturing and services) was nearly four times that in agriculture. It clearly means that this slow-down 
in the transformation of the workforce implies an immense loss in productivity gains. To regain this loss of 
momentum in workforce transformation and to ensure better utilisation of surplus labour is crucial, lying at the heart 
of equity growth in a large agrarian country such as India.  
India’s experience over the past few decades indicates that corporations are out to make profits by cutting costs, 
especially the cost of labour. They create more output per worker but not much employment. For example, Tata Steel 
in Jamshedpur increased its annual production five-fold from 1 million to 5 million tonnes between 1991 and 2006, 
but at the same time it reduced its workforce from 85,000 to 44,000. Similarly, India’s record of employment 
generation has been dismal for over two decades under neoliberal reforms. Despite an annual GDP growth rate of 
over 7%, growth in employment has been less than 1%.  
Moreover, it was expected that an open economy would lead to the availability of cheaper capital goods and 
machinery, and ultimately would result in the expansion of labour intensive industries, but this did not happen. The 
crucial point is whether the neoclassical model provides an adequate framework to understand the development 
process of a huge agrarian country such as India. As Bhaduri argues that, “In the presence of substantially 
under-utilised labour, an extensive growth strategy may still form an essential element in the early phase of 
development process [...] indeed there is something strange about so much attention being paid to ‘efficient 
allocation of resources’ and the price mechanism while ignoring the blatant inefficiency of massive 
under-employment” (Bhaduri, 1993: 11).  
The neoclassical model pretends that the benefits of higher growth ‘trickle down’ to the poor. However, not only is 
this proposition empirically dubious but the time period for this to happen remains unspecified. It seems increasingly 
clear that the government views its role as being that of promoting the corporate sector rather than regulating 
between businesses and the people.  
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British government levied export duties, which made raw wool more expensive to foreign producers; at the same 
time it provided tax exemption and monopolies to those who established themselves as wool manufacturers. This 
continued for nearly a century, followed by a ban on all export of woollen cloth from Ireland from 1699 onwards. 
The suppression of Ireland’s domestic woollen industry was seen as necessary in order to build wool manufacturing 
in England (Girdner and Siddiqui, 2008). The Western countries who today support the free market, in the past saw 
the active role of the state as essential to achieving desired levels of growth and building a strong industrial sector 
(Chang, 2010).  
Thus, historical evidence concerning successful industrialisation confirms that building an industrial base in the 
developing countries would require state support, which would also put a limit on imports ((Siddiqui, 2012a). 
Otherwise the nation in question would be trapped into focusing on exports of raw material and low value products 
as is the case for the majority of the developing countries, a sector that is characterised by diminishing returns and 
often over-supply and negative terms of trade. In a broader historical context, Rist argues that, “The historical 
conditions that would explain the ‘lead’ of some countries over others cannot enter into the argument, since the ‘laws 
of development’ are supposedly the same for all, and ‘win their way through with iron necessity’ [...] this bracket out 
the effects of conquest, colonisation, the slave trade, the dismantling of craft production in India, the breaking of 
social structures, and so on” (Rist, 2009:75). 
Therefore, discussion of past experiences is important. In order to achieve industrialisation, the question arises 
whether reliance should be made on state intervention or market forces in the economy. The Prebisch-Singer model 
argues that government intervention is seen as crucial for successful industrialisation since according to them this 
would lead to diversification of the economy and output. This is considered a necessary prerequisite for affluence. As 
a consequence, not only failed to diversify their economy but also unable to draw people away from agriculture into 
expanding manufacturing sector flourished. Higher growth in the manufacturing sector could lead to higher 
productivity not only in agriculture but also other industries as well. It has been argued that negative trends in terms 
of trade acts as an impediment to the economic progress of the developing countries (Singer, 1987). 
However, the past experiences of Brazil, China, India and Mexico tell us that the ‘import substitution’ policy ran into 
difficulties after some time (Siddiqui, 2015b) This was due to a number of reasons like in the name of protection of 
domestic markets: inefficiency, rent-seeking, and wastefulness of resources flourished. Local producers turned into 
monopolies and thus were able to charge higher prices than imported prices.   
8. Concluding Remarks 
If we consider the 20th century as a whole then the key turning point in terms of industrial development came in 1950, 
soon after India’s independence, not in 1991 as is often portrayed. However, it is true that India has proved unable to 
transform high growth over economic development and general improvement in living conditions for ordinary 
people. In the 1970s, the perception was that India’s industrial policies were wrong, mainly due to two reasons: the 
slowdown in growth rates and the persistent success of East Asian economies in terms of both higher growth rates 
and improvements in living conditions.  
It was said that the ‘import substitution’ strategy to protect domestic industries led to high costs, inefficiency and low 
growth in the economy. Further it is argued that such policies stifled competition, build ‘licence raj’ and suffocated 
entrepreneurship and undermined initiative in the private sector. 
The neoliberal reforms of 1991 in India removed tariffs and barriers to foreign trade and investment. They reduced 
the role of the state and public sector, and dismantled controls, while increasing the role of the market and the private 
sector in the economy. As a result, foreign capital investment and foreign exchange reserves have improved. 
However, job expansion has not taken place and there has been no corresponding decline in the share of agricultural 
employment. Even the much heralded IT sector’s dramatic expansion for the last two decades provided jobs directly 
to less than a million people. 
There has often been talk in recent years of making India a base for labour intensive manufacturing, as Chinese 
wages are rising. It would be misleading to think a large country like India could industrialise and modernise its 
economy with the existing unequal distribution of land and rural assets, with such low investment on education and 
health sector.  
Finally, since 1991 there have been considerable shifts in economic policy towards a greater reliance on market 
forces and a more limited degree of government intervention in the economy. However, it is evident that largely 
relying on market-based growth cannot meet the severe challenges India is currently facing, most notably from 
persistent economic and social deprivation. This study has found that more than two decades have passed since the 
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neoliberal reforms were launched, but industrial growth has still not witnessed rapid expansion, especially in 
manufacturing areas. And it seems that neoliberal policies have failed to create jobs and thus improve the living 
conditions of significant proportion of the population, which will most likely impose ever greater constraints on the 
economic growth itself. Therefore, to combat these problems certainly requires effective government policy 
intervention, especially in areas such as education and health sectors, which could ultimately have very positive 
effects on industrial growth and productivity. 
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